Recent events in Russia starkly reveal the catastrophic direction of the country’s national and ethnic policies. Muslim peoples living in Russia are now targets of a new wave of repression. The overt anti-Azerbaijani statements by certain media figures, particularly those close to the Kremlin like Solovyov, raise serious suspicions of state-sponsored Islamophobia. What was once a covert policy has now entered an open phase.
In an era where chauvinistic sentiments and ethnic discrimination have reached their peak, Russia faces not only political and economic crises but also a profound decline in legal values. The lawlessness and brutality against Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg reflect only a fraction of this degradation, according to the article titled “Russia Drowning in a Wave of Chauvinism: A New Phase of Repression Against Migrants and Minority Peoples,” by Member of Parliament Rizvan Nabiyev published by 1news.media
Analysis of the Yekaterinburg events confirms that the prejudiced treatment of migrants is not merely a local initiative but part of a broader, centrally tacitly approved policy.
The ongoing war in Ukraine has exacerbated Russia’s military manpower shortages, leading to the exploitation of migrants to fill this gap – not through voluntary recruitment but through overt coercion. Migrants are blackmailed with alleged crimes and threatened with harm to their families. Those who refuse face deportation.
Russian citizens of non-Russian ethnicities, including Azerbaijanis and others, are also victims of this policy, facing pressure based on both ethnic and religious grounds.
Statements by Alexander Bastrykin, Chairman of the Russian Investigative Committee, regarding the conscription of migrants into military service confirm that this process is not random but systematically planned. Bastrykin’s statistics and admissions reveal that migrants are no longer just cheap labor but have become “human resources” used as fuel for Russia’s war machine.
The Yekaterinburg incident constitutes a violation of Russia’s national legislation and international obligations. On June 27, the use of force and extreme brutality by Russian law enforcement against Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg, including murders, is a clear example of discrimination and ethnic bias.
Russia, under both its national legislation and international commitments, is obligated to uphold human rights. Article 20 of the Russian Constitution guarantees the right to life, while Article 21 prohibits torture, violence, or degrading treatment. These events must be assessed as violations of these fundamental rights, undermining not only individual freedoms but also the constitutional legal framework.
Furthermore, Russia has violated the provisions of the international Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which it is a party. This convention obliges signatory states to prevent torture and hold perpetrators accountable. The Yekaterinburg incident contradicts the convention’s core provisions, raising questions of international legal responsibility.
From both national and international legal perspectives, these facts constitute human rights violations and demonstrate the state’s failure to fulfill its obligations in this domain.
Overview of issues underlying tensions in Azerbaijan-Russia relations
The ethnically motivated killings in Yekaterinburg have caused deep concern in Azerbaijan’s public and political circles. The demonstrative, selective, and violent actions of Russian law enforcement against Azerbaijanis are not isolated but part of a systematic trend in recent times.
In this context, a planned visit by Azerbaijan’s parliamentary delegation to Moscow has been postponed, and the expected visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk to Azerbaijan this month has been canceled. Azerbaijan has stated that such visits are neither politically nor practically appropriate under the current circumstances. Numerous cultural events have also been canceled. These decisions were made in response to the Yekaterinburg incident and the broader rise in ethnic discrimination against Azerbaijanis.
These steps demonstrate that Azerbaijan prioritizes the safety of its citizens and national interests, demanding equal and mutually respectful relations in international affairs.
Azerbaijan’s growing global role is evident in its function as a strategic transit corridor between Central Asia, China, and Europe. Azerbaijan contributes to the energy security of 12 member states of the European Political Community and maintains strategic partnerships with 16 of its members.
Azerbaijan’s proactive and unifying role in these projects is misperceived by Russia as a shift in the geopolitical balance. The Kremlin responds with various tools of pressure, attempting to compensate for its inability to counter the West by targeting Azerbaijan.
The genesis of Russia’s domestic policy and its negative impact on foreign policy
The current dynamics reveal the multifaceted nature of Russia’s policy toward neighboring states, including those in the South Caucasus. On one hand, Moscow seeks to bolster its weakening regional influence, using available tools as leverage. On the other, it promotes nationalist consolidation through repressive methods to maintain political stability and control public opinion within its multi-ethnic state. This approach has gained urgency amid the socioeconomic fallout and international isolation caused by the ongoing war in Ukraine. To neutralize growing domestic discontent, Russian political circles divert attention to external targets, a traditional Kremlin strategy of masking internal issues by projecting a “domestic or foreign enemy” narrative to manipulate public opinion.
The rise in anti-migrant rhetoric and its escalation to a new phase of violence must be viewed within this framework. This is not only about redirecting domestic social unrest toward migrants but also about evading political responsibility and tightening control over a discontented public through the “internal enemy” concept.
The risk of losing the last real partner in the South Caucasus…
Russia’s attempt to export its domestic crisis is evident. The resurgence of radical revanchists in Armenia – figures like Kocharyan, Sargsyan, and the church – is a result of support from certain Moscow circles, aiming to turn the South Caucasus into a conflict zone again and restore Russia’s image as a “peacemaker” to strengthen its regional position.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s independent, nationally driven foreign policy and its growing role in the region and globally – following the full restoration of its sovereignty – cause unease in Russia’s political establishment, Kremlin-aligned media, and social networks. This has led to an escalation of rhetorical tensions against Azerbaijan, incorporating new elements. However, these moves are unlikely to significantly alter the region’s real power balance. Instead, they strengthen national solidarity in Azerbaijan and bolster public support for the President’s strategic state policy.
One wonders if anyone in the Kremlin is asking what they hope to achieve by risking the loss of their last genuine partner in the South Caucasus, even in challenging times. Since February 1, 2024, when Armenia ratified the Rome Statute, subjecting itself to the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been unable to visit Yerevan. The path to Tbilisi has been closed since 2008, following Russia’s occupation of 20% of Georgia’s sovereign territory. One would hope that Russia’s political elite still includes forces interested in preserving Baku as a partner and fostering normal neighborly and cooperative relations.